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THE RULES
The notation to ble used is as follows: x = hours of legal services empl)oyed by the plaintiff. The lower case x repriesents a varial)le to b1e determined l)y the plaintiff and the upper case X is the specific quantity that would l)e chosen at equilil)riulm. y = hours of legal services emlployed i)y the defendant. The lower case yi represents a variale to ble determinied by the defendant and the upper case Y is the specific (iuantity that would l)e chosein by the defendant at e(quililrium. C = hourly legal feies so Cx and C! are the total legal fees of the plaintiff and the defenidant, respectivelv. P(x,F/) = the prolbability that plaintiff wins the case. 1 -P(x,y) = the probability that defendant wins the case. A = the award if plaintiff wins the case.
In addition to the assumptions implicit in the notation, we will assume that all parties choose so as to maximize expected monetary payoff. This assumption eliminates risk-averse behavior.
Three rules are considered: the American rule, the pure English rule, and a mixed rule. The distinction between the rules is captured by the obljective functions as seen from the point of view of the plaintiff. As will become clear, the mixed rule contains the other two as special cases.
The American rule is distinguished by the fact that each party to litigation pays the entirety of his/her own legal fees. Formally, the decision problem of the plaintiff is to maximize expected profits by a proper choice of x, the number of hours of legal services employed. Expected profits depend upon the choice of strategies (x,y) and are defined as:
nA(x,y) = P(x,y)(A -Cx) + (1 -P(x,y))(-Cx).
In words, the plaintiff must decide how aggressively the case will be pursued. In doing so, the plaintiff is motivated to employ legal services to the point that maximizes the expected net benefit of litigation (the product of the probability of winning and the award net of fees) minus the expected cost of litigation (the product of the probability of losing and the fees of own legal services).
By contrast the English rule induces the expected profit function:
HE(x,I) = P(x,y)A + (1 -P(x,y))(-Cx -Cy).
The problem is to find the value of x which maximizes this function. In words, the expected value of the award is compared to the expected cost of all legal fees to both parties. The prominent feature of the rule is that the plaintiff' pays no legal fees if the plaintiff wins but must pay all legal fees of both parties if the plaintiff loses. The defendant faces a similar problem. A third rule holds that the winner pays a portion, P, of his own legal fees. The loser pays his own fees plus the amount of the legal fees of the winner that are not paid by the winner. That is, the loser pays the proportion (1 -1) of the legal fees of the winner. The objective function from the plaintiff point of view becomes Hl,(x,) = P(x,y)(A -PCx) + (1 -P(x,y))(-Cx -(1 -P)Cy).
Some importaiit features of these formulations should be noted. First, the participants o)bey the expected utility hypothesis and are risk neutral. Second, the amount of the award is independent of the amount of legal talent employed. Third, the possilility of' nonlpaymlent of the award or of the legal fees due to financial limitations of' the loser is inot considered. These points will be considered again later.
LEGAL TECHNOLOGY
A very explicit legal technology will be tusedl in the analysis. This technology is emblodied in the prolbability fiunction that expresses the probablility that the plaintiff will will the case, that is, P(x,y). InI a ssese this probalility reflects the nature of the court system and the )produ(ctivity of tile lawyers in that system. In the economics jargoln, it is a p1roductiol fillnctioln for lawyers.
We will assiume the explicit functional form:
This function has several interesting properties. goes down as the total amount of legal effort (x + y) goes up. That is, the more time devoted to the case by either or both sides, the less sensitive is the likelihood of winning of one side to a small increase in lawyer time.
4. The parameter a measures the sensitivity of the system to the 1 -o effort of the lawyers. The fraction 2 is the part of the probability that 2 cannot be influenced by lawyers. The parameter a is a measure of the power that lawyers have to determine the outcome of the case. If ax=O, the system is completely insensitive to what lawyers do and the probability of winning is 1/2 regardless of legal efforts. If a=l, then with enough expenditure relative to the other side a litigant can make the probability of a win as high as is desired. If a=l, the probability of winning is completely determined by the effort of the lawyers.
5. The formulation does not reflect the "merits" of a case independent of the efforts of the lawyers. Of course such considerations are of interest and can be incorporated. For the analysis at hand, it is best to consider only "equally meritorious" cases in the sense that without legal representation of either party (or only minimal amounts), the probability of winning is 1/2.
RESULTS
The following results are the symmetric Nash e(luilibrium of the noncooperative game.
AMERICAN RULE
The amounts spent on legal services as predicted by the symmetric Nash e(uilibrium of the model when applied to the American rule are 1 CX = CY = -aA. 4
In words, the legal fees of the plaintiff equal those of the defendant and each equals 1/4 aA. So, if a= 1, then each lawyer would be paid 1/ 4 of the amnount A, and in total, 1/2 of the award amiount would be used up in legal fees. A demonstration of the result will be reserved for the mixed-rule case.
Models of this fornm might hold some suggestions about the structure of the American system. For example, Katz notices that on average legal fees of plaintiffs in the United States are about 25 percent of the recovery.
When this statistic is applied to the equilibrium formula above, one can deduce that a=l. That is, the Nash equilibrium model in this simplified form and special assumptions taken together with the data suggests that the legal production function in the United States is completely lawyerdominated.
ENGLISH RULE
The amounts predicted by the symmetric Nash equilibrium are captured by the formula 1 ox CX = CY = -A. 2 1-ax In order to develop some intuition about this result, consider some numerical assumptions. Assume a= 1/2. That is, one-half of the uncertainty is out of the control of lawyers but the other half is determined by the hours that lawyers devote to the case. In this case, where the productivity of the lawyer is 1/2, the total award is used up in legal fees at the equilibrium. If the lawyers are a little Inore productive, say a=2/3, then CX=A and in equilibriul each lawyer is paid the entire award amount. As a grows larger toward 1, the amounts of hours demainded ()y the plaintiff and the defetndant grow without bound.
The case where a=l is interesting as a contilnuation of the example above which argued that a= 1 might actually be descriptive of the legal productivity in the United States. In the technical jargon, the giame under the English rule has no solution if a=l. The litigants each have an incentive to hire more lawyer time beyond that of their opponent blecause ly spendillg enough they can force the opponent to pay both legal fees. The demand for lawyers is infinite. Thus if the facts about the legal productivity in the United States are as conjectured in the example, the implementation of the pure English rule in the United States could result il a virtual explosion of legal fees.
MIXED RULE
The symlmetric Nash equililbrinum tllder the mixed rule is given by)' tile 
CLOSING REMARKS
The analysis above points to an inherent instability of the English rule. This instability can be reduced if the court departs from the pure English rule and fails to award all of the winner's legal fees. Thus the rule becomes mixed and as discussed above the nmotivation to hire lawvers is reduced accordingly. If the court intervenes to reduce the influence of lawvyes and thereby moves away fi-om a lawyer-dominated system (reducing a), the instability is also reduced. The ability of lawvers to affect the amount of the award can produce an instability similar to the award of all lawyer fees, which will also be dampened if the power of the lawyers is dampenled.
Given that a suit is inititated, the closer the system approximates the pure English rule, the greater will be the expenditure on legal fees. As one might expect, this has implications foir the conditions tunder which the plaintiff will initiate a case. The perfect equ(ilibrillum is a usefil tool with which to analyze the incentives to initiate a case. The concept presupp)oses that the individuals look to the expected equilibrium outcome of the conflict before deciding to engage in it. They do not look to the iimmediate benefits of hiring a lawyer, and instead look to the final equilibrium result of a path before initiating travel over that path.
Since the game is symmetric the probability of winning is 1/2 in equilibrium. Let X be the equilibrium number of legal hours employed by plain- The model yields some insight about the principles that govern the systems. The pure English system is inherently unstable. Of course, bankruptcy and the financial limitation on both sides dampen the process. The financial limitation of litigants has the effect of lowering the expected recovery and of increasing the likelihood that a litigant must pay his/her own legal fees, even if an award is won. If the litigants do not have bounded exposure, the legal fees literally go to infinity independent of the award, once litigation is initiated. In order to prevent such big legal fees, the courts can intervene to implement B3 > 0 and thereby move toward the American system by forcing a successful plaintiff to bear a portion of the legal fees. The court can also change legal procedures in ways that make lawyers less productive, that is, reduce a. Both actions will have a dampening effect on the litigation costs under the English rule and given the inherent instability of the English rule, one might expect such procedures and rules to evolve to dampen the explosive nature of the process.
